Ibeling et al. (2023). axiomatize increasingly expressive languages of causation and probability, and Mosse et al. (2024) show that reasoning (specifically the satisfiability problem) in each causal language is as difficult, from a computational complexity perspective, as reasoning in its merely probabilistic or "correlational" counterpart. Introducing a summation operator to capture common devices that appear in applications -- such as the $do$-calculus of Pearl (2009) for causal inference, which makes ample use of marginalization -- van der Zander et al. (2023) partially extend these earlier complexity results to causal and probabilistic languages with marginalization. We complete this extension, fully characterizing the complexity of probabilistic and causal reasoning with summation, demonstrating that these again remain equally difficult. Surprisingly, allowing free variables for random variable values results in a system that is undecidable, so long as the ranges of these random variables are unrestricted. We finally axiomatize these languages featuring marginalization (or more generally summation), resolving open questions posed by Ibeling et al. (2023).

This chapter presents probability logic as a rationality framework for human reasoning under uncertainty. Selected formal-normative aspects of probability logic are discussed in the light of experimental evidence. Specifically, probability logic is characterized as a generalization of bivalent truth-functional propositional logic (short "logic"), as being connexive, and as being nonmonotonic. The chapter discusses selected argument forms and associated uncertainty propagation rules. Throughout the chapter, the descriptive validity of probability logic is compared to logic, which was used as the gold standard of reference for assessing the rationality of human reasoning in the 20th century.

This chapter presents probability logic as a rationality framework for human reasoning under uncertainty. Selected formal-normative aspects of probability logic are discussed in the light of experimental evidence. Specifically, probability logic is characterized as a generalization of bivalent truth-functional propositional logic ( short "logic"), as being connexive, and as being nonmonotonic. The chapter discusses selected argument forms and associated uncertainty propagation rules. Probability logic is a generalization of logicProbability logic as a rationality framework combines probabilistic reasoning with logical rule-based reasoning and studies formal properties of uncertain argument forms. Among various approaches to probability logic ( for overviews see, e.g., Hailperin, 1996; Adams, 1975, 1998; Coletti and Scozzafava, 2002; Haenni, Romeijn, Wheeler, and Williamson, 2011; Demey, Kooi, and Sack, 2017), this chapter reviews selected formal-normative aspects of probability logic in the light of experimental evidence. The focus is on probability logic as a generalization of the classical propositional calculus ( short: logic; for probabilistic generalizations of quantified statements see, e.g., Hailperin, 2011; Pfeifer & Sanfilippo, 2017, 2019).

Standard approaches to probabilistic reasoning require that one possesses an explicit model of the distribution in question. But, the empirical learning of models of probability distributions from partial observations is a problem for which efficient algorithms are generally not known. In this work we consider the use of bounded-degree fragments of the "sum-of-squares" logic as a probability logic. Prior work has shown that we can decide refutability for such fragments in polynomial-time. We propose to use such fragments to answer queries about whether a given probability distribution satisfies a given system of constraints and bounds on expected values. We show that in answering such queries, such constraints and bounds can be implicitly learned from partial observations in polynomial-time as well. It is known that this logic is capable of deriving many bounds that are useful in probabilistic analysis. We show here that it furthermore captures useful polynomial-time fragments of resolution. Thus, these fragments are also quite expressive.

To operate intelligently in the world, an agent must reason about its actions. The consequences of an action are a function of both the state of the world and the action itself. Many aspects of the world are inherently stochastic, so a representation for reasoning about actions must be able to express chances of world states as well as indeterminacy in the effects of actions and other events. This paper presents a propositional temporal probability logic for representing and reasoning about actions. The logic can represent the probability that facts hold and events occur at various times. It can represent the probability that actions and other events affect the future. It can represent concurrent actions and conditions that hold or change during execution of an action. The model of probability relates probabilities over time. The logical language integrates both modal and probabilistic constructs and can thus represent and distinguish between possibility, probability, and truth. Several examples illustrating the use of the logic are given.

In an earlier paper, a new theory of measurefree "conditional" objects was presented. In this paper, emphasis is placed upon the motivation of the theory. The central part of this motivation is established through an example involving a knowledge-based system. In order to evaluate combination of evidence for this system, using observed data, auxiliary at tribute and diagnosis variables, and inference rules connecting them, one must first choose an appropriate algebraic logic description pair (ALDP): a formal language or syntax followed by a compatible logic or semantic evaluation (or model). Three common choices- for this highly non-unique choice - are briefly discussed, the logics being Classical Logic, Fuzzy Logic, and Probability Logic. In all three,the key operator representing implication for the inference rules is interpreted as the often-used disjunction of a negation (b => a) = (b'v a), for any events a,b. However, another reasonable interpretation of the implication operator is through the familiar form of probabilistic conditioning. But, it can be shown - quite surprisingly - that the ALDP corresponding to Probability Logic cannot be used as a rigorous basis for this interpretation! To fill this gap, a new ALDP is constructed consisting of "conditional objects", extending ordinary Probability Logic, and compatible with the desired conditional probability interpretation of inference rules. It is shown also that this choice of ALDP leads to feasible computations for the combination of evidence evaluation in the example. In addition, a number of basic properties of conditional objects and the resulting Conditional Probability Logic are given, including a characterization property and a developed calculus of relations.

This extended abstract presents a logic, called Lp, that is capable of representing and reasoning with a wide variety of both qualitative and quantitative statistical information. The advantage of this logical formalism is that it offers a declarative representation of statistical knowledge; knowledge represented in this manner can be used for a variety of reasoning tasks. The logic differs from previous work in probability logics in that it uses a probability distribution over the domain of discourse, whereas most previous work (e.g., Nilsson [2], Scott et al. [3], Gaifinan [4], Fagin et al. [5]) has investigated the attachment of probabilities to the sentences of the logic (also, see Halpern [6] and Bacchus [7] for further discussion of the differences). The logic Lp possesses some further important features. First, Lp is a superset of first order logic, hence it can represent ordinary logical assertions. This means that Lp provides a mechanism for integrating statistical information and reasoning about uncertainty into systems based solely on logic. Second, Lp possesses transparent semantics, based on sets and probabilities of those sets. Hence, knowledge represented in Lp can be understood in terms of the simple primative concepts of sets and probabilities. And finally, the there is a sound proof theory that has wide coverage (the proof theory is complete for certain classes of models). The proof theory captures a sufficient range of valid inferences to subsume most previous probabilistic uncertainty reasoning systems. For example, the linear constraints like those generated by Nilsson's probabilistic entailment [2] can be generated by the proof theory, and the Bayesian inference underlying belief nets [8] can be performed. In addition, the proof theory integrates quantitative and qualitative reasoning as well as statistical and logical reasoning. In the next section we briefly examine previous work in probability logics, comparing it to Lp. Then we present some of the varieties of statistical information that Lp is capable of expressing. After this we present, briefly, the syntax, semantics, and proof theory of the logic. We conclude with a few examples of knowledge representation and reasoning in Lp, pointing out the advantages of the declarative representation offered by Lp. We close with a brief discussion of probabilities as degrees of belief, indicating how such probabilities can be generated from statistical knowledge encoded in Lp. The reader who is interested in a more complete treatment should consult Bacchus [7].

We present a mechanism for constructing graphical models, specifically Bayesian networks, from a knowledge base of general probabilistic information. The unique feature of our approach is that it uses a powerful first-order probabilistic logic for expressing the general knowledge base. This logic allows for the representation of a wide range of logical and probabilistic information. The model construction procedure we propose uses notions from direct inference to identify pieces of local statistical information from the knowledge base that are most appropriate to the particular event we want to reason about. These pieces are composed to generate a joint probability distribution specified as a Bayesian network. Although there are fundamental difficulties in dealing with fully general knowledge, our procedure is practical for quite rich knowledge bases and it supports the construction of a far wider range of networks than allowed for by current template technology.